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Lights Hidden Under Bushels Case 
Thomas A. Green1 
Some forty years ago, Charlie Donahue created a course which he titled 
"Law, Morals and Society." Designed for undergraduates, and situated 
among the offerings of the University of Michigan's interdisciplinary Medi-
eval and Renaissance Collegium, the course reflected the approach to doing 
history that, as this volume recognizes, Charlie has followed throughout 
his long and enormously influential career as scholar, teacher, lecturer, and 
inepressible master of well-timed interventions during conference-pan-
el discussion periods. "LMS" was composed of four units. Charlie, who 
taught two of them, led off with the legal basis for the deposition of Rich-
ard II; I followed with the law of homicide in medieval England; Charlie re-
turned with a unit on the law of maniage; Tom Tentler anchored the relay 
with the law relating to witchcraft. In each unit, we began with do_cuments 
that expressed the law involved, and just as the students began to feel com-
fortable with those documents and the way what they expressed seemingly 
helped to organize a bit of rhe premodern world, we subjected the law to 
an investigation based on political, social and cultural contexts that rudely 
upset initial conceptions of how that bit of the world was organized-of 
just what constituted the law, and in what way whatever was the law can be 
said to have gone about its organizing work. A very Charlie sort of course. 
1. I thank Elizabeth Papp Kamali and t-1ichael Lobban for insightful com· 
ments on an earlier draft of this e.ssay and Brittany Harrison for excellent editorial 
help. 
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At the time, I was teaching a seminar on the history of the criminal 
trial jury in England and America. Jury independence, and even jury nulli-
fication, played a large role. Hence my interest in Bushel's Case and, thanks 
in large part to Charlie, my interest in the light that its context shone on 
the opinion. So what was its context? A very Charlie sort of question, but I 
don't recall what Charlie said one ought to do if it didn't appear to have an 
answer. Surely he didn't advise turning one's musings about it into a Fest-
schrift essay! Mea culpa, Charlie. 
THB TBX'f INTRODUCED 
Bushel's Case (1670)2 was mysterious to me some thirty years ago, when I 
devoted a long chapter to the case and its context, and I am even more per-
plexed by it today.3 That it was a mystery was not quite tny point in 1985; it 
is, however, the point of this brief return to the case by way of comment on 
some recent work that aims to shed light 0111 the opinion of John Vaughan, 
Chief Judge of Common Pleas, writing for all of the active high judges of 
England. Directed at the opinion itself, which held that jurors could not 
be fined or imprisoned on the grounds that their verdict was against 
fact or law, the new light plays on the soil out of which the opinion 
arose. We are left to speculate about whether, and to what extent, what 
the light reveals actually nourished one of the stateliest of growths in the 
forest of English law. 
On the face of it, there is little mystery as to the reasons Vaughan ad-
duced for his holding. A judge could not be certain jurors had gone against 
the facts as they perceived them; therefore, as law arises from the facts, 
the judge could not be certain jurors went against the law. Why could the 
judge not know jurors abused their fact-finding authority? Because the ju-
rors might have out-of-court knowledge of their own regarding the facts or 
reliability of witnesses in a particular case; because the jurors might reach a 
different understanding than the judge with respect to in-coun testimony 
("even then the Judge and jury might honestly differ in the result from the 
2.. Vaughan 135, 124; English Reports 1006 (1670). 
3. Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Co.nscience: Perspectives on the 
English Crirninal Trial jury, i200-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), ch. 
6. 
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evidence"1), and it was the jurors' understanding that counted. Why was it 
the jurors' understanding that counted? Because the common law, by long 
tradition, proceeded by trial by jury, which would be a waste of time if judg-
es could supplant jurors' understandings with their own, and it would be 
unreasonable to make jurors swear to what they did not believe.5 
This seems tolerably clear as a set of general propositions that effec-
tively establish a plenary rule. All cases short of those involving provable 
ministerial wrongdoing-i.e., verdicts tainted by bribery, coercion, etc.-
are shielded from inquiry by the very logic of such' a l'ule. There might be 
thought a weakness here. If the assumption is that jurots are not permitted 
to reject the judge's instructions as to law, why is their compliance with 
that instrnction not subject to investigation? Possibly it is subject, up to a 
point-by havingjurors state on oath that they did not reject those instruc-
tions (Accol'ding to the logic of the rule, such an oath would leave no basis 
for certainty of their non-compliance). But why only up to that point? Why 
not require jurors to state the facts found (or the opinions they entertained 
as to witness credibility) that led them to acquittal within the parameters 
of the instructions? The answer, one supposes, is that judges can't judge 
the veracity of such sworn responses, fot the very reasons underlying the 
rule. TI1ere is also the possibility of an unstated broader consideration here: 
such close questioning might amount to a form of coercion. Jurors might be 
led into sweating what they did not believe "though the [induced/coerced) 
verdict be right.'~ 
The breadth and conclusiveness of the ruling in Bushel's Case are ap-
parent when one considers the immediate context in which the case arose. 
Edward Bushel was one of the jurors imprisoned (until they paid a heavy 
fine) for their verdict of acquittal in the prosecution, in 1670, of William 
Penn and William Mead for unlawful assembly and disturbance of the 
peace. TI1e two Quaker preachers had preached in Gracechurch Street, 
London, and had not desisted when ordered to do so, at which point a tu-
4. Vaughan, 147; Englisl1 l~~ports, 10 12. 
5. Vaughan, 143; E11glisli Reports 10101 Vaughan, 148; Englisl1 Reports, 10 1:z.-13. 
Also, impommd y-bur wid1out explanarion- V:mgh:m vcnrurcd char to "omit" or 
"abolish" cl1e criminal trial j u1·y would be "tbe greacer mischief co rhe people, d1an co 
abolish them in civil tryals." Vaughan, 144; English Reports, 1010. 
6. Vaughan, 148; English Reports, 1013. 
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mult had ensued. According to those trial accounts that we have (mainly 
one by Penn7 and one by Samuel Starling, Lord Mayor of London, who 
presided at the trial), 8 Penn questioned the law underlying the indictment: 
and exhorted his jurors to adjudge that law insufficient, against the laws 
of England.9 Penn was removed from the courtroom proper for his state-
ments and behavior; within his hearing, the trial continued, over his out-
cries from the bale dock to which he had been consigned. The jury divided, 
eight for guilty, four not, and was sent out to reconsider, whereupon the 
jurors returned a verdict of "Guilty of speaking in Gracechurch Street." 
Sent out again, upon orders to reach a general verdict, the jurors agreed on 
acquittal. Bushel, deemed one of the leaders of a court-room insurrection, 
refused to pay the fine and sued out a writ of habeas cqrpus addressed to 
the Court of Common Pleas, Vaughan presiding. After some doubts-
Vaughan expressing chem for his own part-about whether Common 
Pleas was the proper venue for such a writ, the Court accepted the case 
based upon the return ro the writ, which alleged chat the prisoners had, 
as jurors, found against the fact and against the law. After a plenary ses-
sion with the other common law judges (save for John Kelyag, Chief Judge 
of King's Bench, whose illness had sidelined him), Vaughan authored the 
ruling outlined above. 
It is, I suppose, imaginable that the jurors could agree only that Penn 
and Mead had preached in Gracechurch Street, but not that they had 
caused an unlawful assembly or a disturbance of the peace, even under the 
law as it was understood by the bench. One doesn't need to blot out Penn's 
exhortations regarding the law, or the possibility that they had some effect 
upon the jurors. One might suppose it possible that those pleas to the jurors 
merely reinforced their sincere inclination to view the facts as unproved. Or 
reinforced their doubts about the credibility of crown witnesses, or their 
susceptibility to believe out-of-court evidence-e.g., statements by some of 
those present at the preaching that had come to the attention of some of the 
7. William Penn and William Mead, 7he People's Antient and Just Liberties 
(London: n.p. 1670), printed in State Trials, 6.951- 1000. (References hereinafter a1·e 
to State Trials.) 
8. Sir Samuel Starling, An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet, 
entitled, The Trial oJW. Penn and W. Mead (London: W.G., 1671). 
9. State Trials, 6.959. 
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jurors. Conceptually, at least, it is possible that Penn and Mead's case fell 
within the logic of the ruling in Bushel's Case, including, importantly, the 
logic that an inquiry to determine whether or not it did was itself preclud-
ed. The rule in Bushel's Case was that conclusive. 
WIDER CONTEXTS INTRODUCED 
Two recent and important discussions of Bushel's Case attempt to explain 
Vaughan's opinion-either what he really had in mind or what led him, 
perhaps subconsciously, to think about jury trial in the way that he did. 
Neither account denies the possible influence of the immediate political 
and legal context that scholars have sometimes emphasized. The main 
(and by now familiar) elements of that context include: worl'ies about the 
i·estored monarchy's manipulation of the judiciary and suppression of lib-
erties; the spate of jury finings in the 1660s (King's Bench Judges Hyde, 
Twisden, and Kelyng being the most commonly cited); Commons' censure 
of Kelyng on grounds of fining and disrespect for Magna Carta; Vaughan's 
leading role in Commons' anti-fining campaign.10 What the new accounts 
intend, rather, is the supplying of a philosophical framework for Vaughan's 
and others' opposition to fining, one that helps to explain that opposition 
and is not ~erely the plaything of the politics of the day. 
James Whitman comes at the opinion from the perspective of what 
he terms a "moral comfort" rule, that, from the Middle Ages forward, ap-
plied to judges and jurors: according to theological prescript, one's soul was 
imperiled by wrnngful conviction in cases involving the blood sanction (and 
perhaps even more broadly), bur honest belief that guik was beyond a. rea-
sonable doubt protected one against such peril.11 This, Whitman claims, is 
key to understanding the importance 0£ and the tespect accorded to, ver-
dicts according to conscience throughout the common law period, at least: 
into the eighteenth century, and especially in felony, which was almost uni-
10. l11is background is discussed in, e.g., Green, Verdict Accordi11g to Con-
science, 208- zi; John A. Phillips and Thomas C. Thompson, "Jurors v. Judges in Lat-
er Stuart Engl11nd: ·n1c Penn/Mead Trial and B11sl1dl's Case," Law and I11e'luality 4 
(1986), 189- 229. 
11. James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of 
the Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 6. 
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formly capital. There is grear power in this accou nt. The challenge it poses 
for our understanding of the medieval English criminal law is only now 
being met.11 Whitman invites che reader co consider Vaughan's opinion in 
lighr of this longstandiag context, rhe rheology of "moral com fore," sriil, he 
argues, both identifiable and broadly influential in lace-seventeenth-cen-
tury legal-moral thought. It helps us to understand judicial reticence to 
take the verdict-rendering act into their own hands; to see that the creation 
and retention of tdal by jury had a deep underlying logic- indeed, a moral 
dimension; to recognize that the too-dose questioning of jurors' motiva-
tions threatened to disturb what was thought best left between them and 
their own consciences-that is, between them and God. Armed with these 
insights, we are able to appreciate Vaughan's invocation qf what might oth· 
erwise seem an insincere-because no-longer often applicable- claim that 
jul'Ors might (for all the judge can ever know) have brought to bear private 
knowledge in their fact-finding process. 
Kevin Crosby, too, focuses on "the role of conscience in jury deliber-
ations" in his enterprising article, "Bushell's Case and the Juror's Soul."13 
Crosby recognizes the foundational importance of Whitman's work, but 
he sees Whitman's perspective as limited: 
Whitman's focus on the moral dangers of judging, and the con-
comitant need to find ways of soothing judges' consciences, means that 
the focus in his account is on how criminal justice systems have coaxed 
cautious judges (which here includes jurors) into convicting. This is an im-
portant perspective. However, it downplays t he capacity of the later seven-
teenth-century criminal jury to do something other than what the other 
actors involved in the administration of the criminal law wouid have liked 
it to do.14 
The period in face witnessed a flowering of jury-independence the· 
ory, a concept of the jury wherein the individual juror's conscience-his 
"soul"-was paramount: "Bushell's Case, taken together with the concur-
12. See Elizabeth Papp Kamali, "A Felonious Scace of Mind: Mens Rea in 
Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century England" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 2015). 
13, Kevin Crosby, "Bushell's Case and the Juror's Soul," The Journal of Legal 
History 33 (2012), 251-290, at 253. 
14. Ibid., 253-54. 
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rent pamphlet literature, offers a positive inodel of jury trial which down-
plays the jury's relationship dcher with the judge's or with the sovereign's 
laws in favour of a focus on the juryman's soul."15 Once we see this, we see 
"moral comfort" relative to convicting a defendant as only one aspect of a 
verdict according to conscience at the time of Bushell's Case and ofless im-
portance than the contemporary reconceptualization of the relationships 
among institutions of governance. We see that jury theory now embraced 
a positive and constitutive idea of the "juror's soul." TI1is development 
marked a significant departure from traditional theory, according to which 
the jury was understood precisely in relation to the monarch and/or judge. 
Crosby draws clear contrasts between late-seventeenth-century jury theory 
and those of Coke (who emphasized the role of the judge in relation to the 
jury) and Hobbes (who emphasized the role of the sovereign), and whose 
own great differences pale alongside the differences between them and the 
"soul"-based radical jury independence that was to follow: jurors' primary 
duty was to themselves, not to the bench or crown. We are invited not only 
to read Vaughan's opinion in light of this new model of jury trial and jury 
theory, but to see that opinion as expounding the new posicions.16 
It is useful, I think, to view Whitman's and Crosby's approaches 
to the context of Vaughan's opinion in Bushel's Case both separately and 
conjointly. TI1ese are both highly sophisticated, intricately woven accounts 
of jury theory extending over lengthy periods, each deserving fuller con-
sideration than it will receive here, as my main objective is to think out 
loud about their relation to Vaughan's opinion. Whitman begins his En-
glish-side account with the thirteenth century and carries down to modern 
times, focusing on Bushel's Case at one turn in his story. Crosby, though 
aiming at and ending with that case, interprets lace seventeenth-century 
jury theory in relation co currents of that theory dating from the fifteenth 
century. Crosby's account may be said to fit into Whitman's at the macro 
level: conscience and duty in the eyes of God forms a background for him. 
But his study grows outward from there. Crosby postulates that from the 
concern identified by Whitman, and other more political-theory-based 
strains of thought, came a positive conception of jury independence that 
15. Ibid., Abstract. 
16. Ibid., 270-80. 
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affected the rendering of verdicts generally in criminal cases. The impli-
cations of this difference seem modest when one focuses on their mol'e or 
less equal concern with what they take to be a distinctly contemporary 
resonance in Vaughan's invocation of conscience. They differ, however, in 
the particular contemporary writings upon which they focus in providing 
context fo1· that invocation (a matter not discussed here). As already noted, 
their differing approaches produce different proposed insights into either 
what Vaughan was really thinking or why Vaughan- perhaps unselfcon-
sciously-came out the way he did. 
THE TEXT IN RELATION TO THE PROPOSED CoNTEXT(s) 
Personal Knowledge 
Even one who would assert that the true basis for the opinion remains a 
matter of Vaughan's own personal knowledge would quickly agree that 
jurors' personal knowledge played a significant role in the Chief Judge's 
thinking. The questions that historians ·are left with have to do with how 
Vaughan mainly defined personal knowledge and his reasons for giving 
various forms of that knowledge real or apparent weight. The classic form 
of such knowledge-and the one that seems to dominate the opinion-
is pre-formed, out-of-court knowledge concerning the facts of the case at 
hand. These might be physical or mental facts, that is, facts about what 
the defendant did or thought that were not brought forward at the trial. 
They might also be "background" facts about the defendant or witnesses 
that a juror (or jurors) thought affected the credibility of what parties said 
in court.17 
This kind of knowledge has obvious roots in "self-informing," long as-
sumed to be a staple of early-jury process. It is generally agreed that by the 
late seventeenth centll1'y- indeed, well before-self-informing in the liter-
al sense was a relatively rare feature of criminal process. But if one expands 
the literal meaning to something like an awareness of community-based 
understandings- even rumors- the situation is more difficult to assess. 
Pre-trial process, including coroners' inquests (in homicide), depositions, 
and grand jury proceedings, yielded information available to the bench 
17. See especially Vaughan, 147; English Reports, ror2. 
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and, where read aloud in court, to jurors, but those records were not taken 
to include most discordant minority views, including some that might have 
been in circulation. Of course, they needn't be comprehensive so long as 
jurors were legally bound to render a verdict solely on the evidence given at 
the trial. But jltst where such a rule stood in that regard as of the late sev-
enteenth century is open co question. For his part, Vaughan did not deem 
there to be such a rule; that's the basis of his stated reliance-to whatever 
extent genuine18-on this kind of personal knowledge. 
The second form of personal knowledge might better be termed a 
right to make an independent assessment (interpretation) ofin-court testi-
mony (swom and unsworn). This assessment involved what fac ts were truly 
in play, which in turn involved an assessment of narratives and, importantly, 
of the credibility of narrators. The two forms of personal knowledge over-
lap at a point: that is, where pre-formed knowledge/impressions colored 
assessment of in-court narratives/narrators. But Vaughan can certainly be 
18. Focusi ng on Vaughan's heavy reliance on the literal fot·m of personal 
knowledge, John Langbein has characterized Vaughan's opinion as "wilfully anach· 
ronistic" and "dishonest nonsense." John H. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before 
the Lawyers," U11ivcr$ily of Chicago Law Revfow 45 (r978), i99, nn. 105 :ind i98; see 
also John H. Langbein, The Origins of A dvc:rsary Crimi'1al Trial (New York: Oxford 
University P ress, 2003), 324 , Langbein aptly criticizes Vaughan's h andling of six-
reench-centut·y p1·ecedcnr regarding j urors' personal knowledge and rightly mocks 
Vaughan's hardly credible claim, chat (in his own day) "the better and greater pare 
of the evidence may be wholly unknown [co the j udge]; and chis may happen in most 
cases, and often doth .. ,." Vaughan, 149; E11glisl> Reports, 1013. Langbein, Criminal Trial 
before the Lawyers, 299, n. 105. Langbein also nores contemporary evidence fo1· the 
fining of jul'Ors which Vaugh;in ontlrs from bis opinion, am{ be explains rhe opin.ion 
largely in terms ofirs political context. fbid ., 2.99- 30, 106- 108. Those who have recent· 
ly soughr to relate Vaugh:1n's cexr co a broader (and more high-minded) context have 
nor fully rebutted Langbein's arguments for treating ir as mere pretext. W hirman, 
Origins of Reasonable Doubt, 176-78 makes a compelling case chat Vaughan's stress 
on our-of-court personal knowledge fit imo a well-known tradition in moral theology 
writings that st ill carded weight and that related closely to "moral comforr" concerns. 
Vaughan's claim char sud1 knowledge was a commonplace, however, strikes a distinct-
ly fa lse noce and perhaps calls inro question Vaughan's motivations in c!focting cbis 
fir. Ln any event, as rhe rcxr chat follows suggests, I myscl f wonder whether this form 
of personal knowledge was in Fact Vaughan's main concern. For an impo1·ranc al'ticle 
on rhe centrality of literal personal knowledge in post-Bushel's Case jul'Y writings, see 
Simon Stern, "Between Local Knowledge and N ational Politics: Debating Rationales 
for Jury Nullification After Bushel's Case," Yale Law Journal Ill (2002), 1815-2002. 
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t·ead to countenance the second form as operating entirely separately from 
the first. Such a reading appears to rest upon the famous words: 
A man cannot see by another's eye, not· hear by another's ear, no more 
can a man conclude or infer the thing to be resolved by another's un-
derstanding or reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury 
give, yet their not being assured it is so from their own understand-
ing, are foresworn, at least in foro conscientiae.19 
It rests, as well, on Vaughan's observation that, even were the jury to have 
no evidence other than that deposed in court, even then the Judge and jury 
might honestly differ in the result from the evidence, <l;S well as two Judges 
may, which often happens.20 
Vaughan's language here clearly embraces "understanding" of what 
is seen and heard, and might go no further than what one would consid-
er sheer cognitive and/or intuitive powers, thus not embracing assessment 
based 011 credibility. Or, more broadly, it might embrace ct·edibility based 
on tone and demeanor. But this particular language does not embrace cred-
ibility that was based (as other and more prominent parts of his opinion 
are) on our-of-court personal knowledge about the parties, Those other 
parts of the opinion are open to the objection that Vaughan well knew such 
personal knowledge was mostly obsolete. This language is not open to that 
objection. 
And it is this language that shades off into intu.ition, impression re-
garding fact 01· psychology that might be thought the ultimate defense of 
jury independence. One could rule against out-of-court personal knowl-
edge- require jurors to swear to such knowledge in open court, thus con-
verting it to in-court testimony. But could a judge, as a purely practical mat-
ter, identify and rule against in-court personal understandings on the basis 
that he could be certain that they were insincere, or sincere but wrong, 
misguided, overly sympathetic? Vaughan claimed the judge could not. Can 
the historian, as judge, claim with certainty that he was being insincere? 
This is not to say that, over and above the practical impossibility of 
such a ruling, there were not moral or ethical bases for precluding such .a 
19. Vaughan, 148; English Reports, 1012-13. 
20. Vaugha11, 147; English Reports, 1012. 
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rule, ones that rose to the level of legal mandate-even to what might be 
called constitutional mandate. 
The Moral Bases for Independence 
Purely as a matter of theory, Whitman's "mot•al comfort," Crosby's inde-
pendence-based-on-juror's-soul, and constitutionalism are analytically sep-
arable but also eminently analytically conjoinable. They can be brought to-
gether because a sheer consticutionalism begs que$tions as to just why the 
constitution stands as it does. And the answers given to this query at any 
particular time- and in any particular context- might be various, ranging 
from "It just is" to any of a number of considerations, some of which might 
have always been present in thinking about the jury, some of which might 
have been of more recent vintage, from some time ago to the virtual present. 
Vaughan, of course, did not settle for "It just is." His opinion is devot-
ed to listing the many reasons why the jury's verdict (and the jurors them-
selves) could not be assailed. I have previously examined those reasons in 
detail, so shall not repeat myself here. What remains a bit puzzling about 
Vaughan's opinion is not only his failure (as I have earlier stressed)21 to 
advert ro (and dismiss) the arguments for true law-finding that Penn made 
at his trial and that surfaced in numerous writings of the day, nor is it only 
Vaughan's total erasure of Restoration precedents for fining and the poli-
tics in which he himself had played a prominent role. One might now add 
to those puzzling matters Vaughan's silence about the awkward position 
(regarding "moral comfod') that Whitman shows some contemporary ob-
servers recognized the jury as being in.22 One might wonder, as well, why 
Vaughan said so Little-if anything- about the juror's "soul" and nothing 
explicit about the idea that the jury occupied a position independent of 
bench and sovereign. 
One response to these new puzzles is simply that judges usually 
hewed to the law, stating it in "black-letter" terms and explicating it along 
21. Green, Ve rdict According to Co11sciencc1 249. 
22. TI1e j ury in Penn and Mead's rrial was, of course, de:iJing with a misdc· 
meanor, not with a capita l offense. 1lrnc migh t be d1oughc :in answer ro d1is particula r 
conundrum. Because Vaughan w1·oce abour che jury in criminal cases quicc generally, 
however, I do noc rhink the context of rhc case necessarily disposes of the macrer. 
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ttaditionalist lines. Evt;n new ideas were commonly made to appeat time-
out-of-mind, or were hinted at only implicitly and in veiled language, es-
pecially if, when broadly stated, they mighrt pose collateral threats to the 
stability of the formal law. At that point, they were not only beneath no-
tice but beneath contempt. This legalise approach, when applied to issues 
central to the legal system as a whole, represented a constrained form of 
constitutionalism-not the "just-is" variety, but something still far short 
of a full airing of the considerations that lay behind the decision. Given 
the resulting opacity, Whitman's and Crosby's important contributions 
to context might well inform the historian about what really moved 
Vaughan, then again they might not. They might instead, by multi-
plying the possibilities regarding what really moved Vaughan, increase 
the mystery, making the old chestnut that is the opi.nion even more dif-
ficult to crack. 
Now one might fairly insist that what the opinion in Bushd's Case 
stood for was not strictly-or even mainly-a matter of what really and 
consciously moved Vaughan. Judicial opinions have meanings beyond that. 
Those meanings depend upon the eyes and ears, the reasoned inferences, 
the informed intuitions of chose who read and/or hear chem. A judge does 
not control the meaning of the law embedded in a living opinion, merely 
that of his own personal intentions embedded in his wtiting that opinion, 
which remain personal to him and are not thereby necessarily the "law" he 
has produced. 'This makes context crncial to our understanding of the law, 
of the contemporary understanding of the meaning of Vaughan's opinion. 
But whatever they might think about this perspective, I suspect Whitman 
and Crosby would say that what really moved Vaughan is indeed of impor-
tance and, further, chat context tells us what really and consciously moved 
him, so chat the only question left to be resolved is why he was so indirect, 
so implicit-so opaque. 
In resisting the conclusion that the newly proposed contexts neces-
sarily reveal Vaughan's thinking (or, even, his subconscious motivations), 
I want to return to what I think we all take to be the crux of the opinion, 
the issue of personal knowledge. The out-of-court variety has ancient roots 
and increasingly diminished importance; it thus seems least affected by 
late-seventeenth century trends of thought. Still, a possible link between 
the out-of-court and the in-court variety remained: jurors might have been 
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rhought to assess credibility and even rhc meaoing of factual nanatives in 
light of whar they k11cw, noc of che "facts" :tS such, but generally oflocal life, 
mores, and circumscances. That was-and remains- an oft-cited reason 
for (what remains of) the vicinage rule. 
Jury assessment of in-court testimony and demeanor lies at the 
heart of the matter, and always had. It could be defended on its own 
terms. It connected seamlessly with the fact that the defendant had put 
himself "on the country" rnther than on the bench. It connected, too, 
with the politics of central versus local control, and, with the political 
economy of the taking of life by command of the law. Its connection with 
another of Vaughan's apparently leading reasons-that if the judge may 
decide fact, what is the point in using a jury-of course begs the question, 
why, indeed, use a jury. But from Vattghan's perspective che fact thac tbe 
English did use juries, and had for the past 450 years (rather rhan rhe 
instrumental considerations just noted), might have- for :all we know-
rendered conjectures as to the answer of the begged question ultra vi-
re$. Legalism/conscimrionalism had, as it were, a life of irn own. I myself 
wonder whether it is entirely fanciful to suggest chat this "life of its own" 
led Vaughan t:0 erase tbe Restoration, to consider its politics irrelevant 
(except in so far as they reflected what he deemed a proper respect for the 
constirntional position of the jury) and the recent instances of fining not 
"precedents" but, instead, judicial actions whose legality were themselves 
sub Judice in Bushel's Case. 
None of this denies that "moral comfort"-in this case that of the 
bench-helps to explain why the English adopted and then clung to the 
jury, especially in cases of blood. Nor does it deny that judges, Vaughan 
included, were well a.ware of this, despite their reticence about listing it as 
a reason for using the jury, much less specifying it as a reason for allowing 
discretion to the jmies on which the bench had off-loaded the "peril" in-
volved in judging. Nor does it deny that, by the late-seventeenth century, 
the sort of de facto jury independence that had always been a corollary 
of its powers of in-court assessmenc of testimony and demeanor had, as 
Crosby would have it, been theorized in some quarters in terms of a new 
form of constitutional independence. And those who might conjecture 
chat Vaughan's attention to "eyes and ears,". etc., bespeaks the influence 
of lace-seventeenth-century science (here, epistemology) might also have 
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a point.23 All that it denies is that we can yet know from context what the 
text meant, as Vaughan created and understood it. 
THB TBxT IN THB CoNTBXT OF DoING HxsToRY 
I have fenced off, for lack of space, some important issues of context. So 
too did Vaughan fence them off, and one of my central points has been 
that we don't yet know just why he did so. There is still plenty of room for 
further assessment of the context of Bushel's Case. I mean to encourage that 
assessment, but, as is clear, I hope also to encourage further discussion of 
Vaughan's opinion- of the text itself. It has always struck me as an odd 
composition, at a few points tantalizingly of its day, but mainly resolutely 
a voice from the past that resonates far less than w~ might expect with 
Restoration events and thought.24 In that regard, it remains SOJllething of 
a mystery, and just why it remains so is a question worthy. of historians' 
interest, even if one of less moment than questions about Restoration jury 
theory more generally. 
The form and content of Vaughan's opinion bear relation not only 
to what Vaughan thought about the questions raised by Bushel's Case but 
also to a broader matter not yet addressed in this essay. That matter is 
what might be called the "silent power" of the cdminal ttial jury, evident 
from its inception down to modern times. Like almost any institution or 
prncess, the criminal trial jury produced unintended effects, and given its 
place in the political and social order, the jury's effects were bound to be of 
special importance. Some thirty years ago, I noted-by way of tentative hy-
potheses-some of these effects. For example, de facto jµry law-finding (or, 
if you prefer, highly discretionary fact-finding) created a rough-and-ready 
distinction between murder and manslaughter well befo1·e the law began to 
give formal recognition to that distinction in the sixteenth century. I sug-
23. On the theme of the new epistemology, see Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability 
a11d Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between 
Natural Science, Religion, History, Law and Literature (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1983), ch. 5. 
24. I have, for lack of space, omitted discussion of Vaughan's fascinating han-
dling of the question whether the writ of attaint pertained to criminal cases. He con-
cluded that it did not, thus depriving himself of an easy out: if attaint was available, 
the fining of jurors would t'aise the possibility of"double jeopardy." 
Lights Hidden Under Bushel's Case 4II 
gested that centuries of trial-jury practi<:e were influential in the emet·gence 
of chis formal legal development, whether or not those who legislated the 
change were aware of that influence, so that what came from "above" ulti-
mately derived from what existed "below." In simila1· fashion, longstanding 
jury practice might well have played a "silent" role in the legislating of cler-
gyability for much simple larceny. And so on.2~ 
At another level, the criminal trial jury played a role in the produc-
tion of its own staying power. To be sure, this institutional permanence 
resulted from a matdx of decisions by legal, political, and social actors in 
accordance with their interests. The jury, in this regard, was object not sub-
ject; it was acted upon. Yet the power of the idea of the jury might be said 
to have emanated in part simply from the jury's being what it was-from 
its having become an inviolable part of the constitution. 111is is difficult to 
separate conceptually from the "interest" possessed by that other legal ac-
tor, the judge, in remaining true to the law, and certainly to constitutional 
principles. It is perhaps a matter of taste whether or not we ascribe to the 
jury itself some power in the maintenance of the particular judicial fidelity 
to the robe that manifested itself in the bench's legitimation of the jury, 
but Vaughan's opinion, which at points reads a bit like settled conviction in 
search of a rationale, might be deemed testimony to this particular silent 
power of the jury. 
Present ideas can be born from age-old practices originally created to 
serve distinct interests. Those practices, and indeed those interests, might 
live on, but so ~ight a later-emerged but by now well-aged idea of the ap-
propriateness- even constitutionally-required essence-of the practice it-
self. The constitutional requirement of determination of criminal guilt by a 
lay jury under instructions from the judge as to the law the jury must apply 
to the facts it found was an idea that lived on alongside the idea chat it was 
in the interest of judges as individuals and of the state as defender of the 
law that a lay jury be seen to have shouldered the civil duty of determining 
criminal responsibility. 26 That Vaughan did not invoke the latter idea hard-
ly means that it didn't occur to him, or, even, that it wasn't the driving force 
behind his opinion. It suffices to say, however, that the form and substance 
25. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, esp~cially125, 147, 314-15, n. 146, 377-82. 
26. Whitman, Origins of Reasonable Doubt, 178-84, rightly emphasizes the idea 
of duty in writings in the aftermath of Bushel's Case. 
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of that opinion leave open the possibility that little more than the appeal 
of a vital abstraction was at work. And the question of the proportional 
influence of the many forces (political, social, religious, 01· otherwise phil-
osophical) driving the appeal of that abstraction is still open for historical 
investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
1here can be no certainty about the ultimate success of such investigation. 
The text, taken by itsel£ might prove forever unyielding, and as for the 
hope that study of the context will elucidate the text, it might mrn out that 
one just can't get here from the1·e. Of course, historians wouldn't neces-
sarily know that success was utterly foreclosed, so they likely would go on 
trying to unveil che meaning of the text via new insights regarding context. 
I think Charlie would count the possibility of ultimate irresolution part 
of the challenge and not a bad thing-anyway, not a tragedy. I wonder, 
though, whether he would go a further step. Is he sufficiently perverse-as 
I surely am-to think that, in this particular context, absolute certainty 
would be regrettable? 
Suppose, for example, an historian discovered a le.teer verifiably from 
Vaughan to a friend that explained the "true" rationale of his opinion in 
laborious detail. Such a document would be a real find. It would merit pub-
lication, and were the finder a junior in the profession, it would make a nice 
contribution to his or her tenure file. We would, foully, really know what 
Vaughan was thinking. Bliss! 
But would we not have lost something? One more old chestnut down 
the drain. There aren't many such cases that so powe1-fully test the histori-
an's archival skills and imagination. It is true that Vaughan's actual motiva-
tions, once learned, might be of considerable interest and might themselves 
spin off new problems that would go part way to off.. set the loss. I can't help 
feeling, however, that they would go only part of the way, and no more. 
